Housing Market Bubbles and Currency Crisis: the case of Thailand by Kar-yiu Wong
Housing Market Bubbles and Currency Crisis:




(forthcoming in Japanese Economic Review)Abstract
This paper explains with a simple model the collapse of the housing market
in Thailand prior to the economic crisis in 1997. It is shown that successive
periods of impressive growth of the economy has created not only higher
demands for housing, but also an increase in people’s optimism about the
conditions of the market in the future. Both oversupply and bubbles were
formed before the market ﬁnally crashed. The model is used to explain some
of these phenomena, and to describe the nature of the bubbles. An ironic
possibility is that a faster and more persistent growth of the economy tends
to increase the vulnerability of the ﬁrms in the market.
This paper was presented at the international conference on “The Asian
Crisis: The Economics Front,” which was held in Seattle, December 29-30,
1998. Thanks are due to Chong K. Yip for valuable comments and to Yi-Chi
Chen for his able and eﬃcient assistance.
c ° Kar-yiu Wong.1 Introduction
The recent Asian ﬁnancial/currency crisis, which began with the ﬂoating of
the Thai baht on July 2, 1997, has surprised many people. Not only the
depth of the impacts on these economies, but also the speed of the contagion
and the number of countries aﬀected were unexpected and unprecedented.
What seemed to be more puzzling was that these economies had been doing
ﬁne before the crisis, with impressive growth and solid fundamentals. Even
before the eve of the crisis, nearly all forecasts were predicting positive and
high growth rates for these economies for the years of 1997 and 1998. How
wrong they were!
What has happened and what went wrong? Economists, trying to catch
up, are searching for answers.
This paper focuses on Thailand and suggests a theory. There are sev-
eral reasons for looking at Thailand.1 First, nearly all countries in East and
Southeast Asia experienced pressure in the crisis, but Thailand was the ﬁrst
country to experience tremendous currency speculative attacks and the ﬁrst
one to be forced to signiﬁcantly devalue its currency. Second, the current
ﬁnancial crisis seems to be diﬀe r e n tf r o mm a n yp r e v i o u so n e si nm a n yw a y s . 2
In particular, these countries have shown high growth rates before the cri-
sis,3 and the governments had responsible ﬁscal and macroeconomic policies.
Third, Thailand did show some warning signs of a troubled economy before
the crisis although most people had chosen to ignore them. Probably the
most troubling spot in the economy was its housing and real estate sector.
The troubles in the Thai housing market can be partially attributed to
the growth of the economy, which took oﬀ sometime in the sixties to sev-
1See Wong (2000) for an analysis of the crisis in South Korea.
2Krugman (1998) and Corsetti, et. al. (1998) have suggested that the ﬁrst-generation
crisis models, which focus on the inconsistency between a ﬁxed exchange rate regime
and the ﬁscal and macroeconomic policies pursued by the governments, and the second-
generation models, which emphasize multiple equilibria, expectation of the speculators,
and self-fulﬁlling are not suﬃcient to explain the current Asian crisis. See also a recent
survey by Saxena and Wong (2000).
3South Korea is one of the four Asian newly industrialized countries, while countries
like Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines are emerging economies.
1enties, and continued to grow with high rates but little interruptions.4 The
long period of growth has created an over-heated housing market. New hous-
ing units were built to satisfy the ever-growing demands caused by the hot
economy. The supply of housing was further fueled in the nineties by the
liberalization of capital inﬂow as a result of the passage of Bangkok Interna-
tional Banking Facilities in 1992, which provided opportunities to domestic
ﬁnancial institutions for borrowing foreign loans at low rates and then lending
the money to local housing developers.5
The sector began to feel pressure in 1995. The pressure came from two
fronts: the overproduction of houses and oﬃce space, and the central bank’s
squeeze on lending. The overproduction of housing created excess supply,
while developers were reluctance to lower the housing prices to clear the
market.6 The lending squeeze worsened the cash ﬂow problems of the devel-
opers, making them more diﬃcult to get the ﬁnance to survive. By 1996,
the sector showed many signs of troubles. The sector’s debts totalled around
800 billion bahts in 1996. In February 1997, several months before the cri-
sis, Somprasong Land Plc defaulted on interest payments on euro-convertible
debentures worth $80 million.
The Somprasong default was followed by those of other ﬁrms, which then
put pressure on many banks and ﬁnancial institutions, especially the small
ones. In June, one month before the ﬂoating of the baht, 16 ﬁnance compa-
nies were suspended. Two months later, another 42 received the same fate.
Toward the end of the year, 56 more were closed permanently.7
The growth of the Thai economy has unintentionally enhanced the impact
of the problems in the housing market on the rest of the economy, as diﬀerent
sectors became interrelated and interdependent. As the housing market were
having diﬃculties, the banking and ﬁnancial sector became squeezed. This
in turn put pressure on other parts of the economy. When the conditions of
the economy got worse, investors lost conﬁdence and started to move their
capital out of the country. The latter eﬀect accentuated like a snow ball
4See Lo and Wong (1998) for statistical data of Thailand and some other countries in
this crisis.
5Loans from ﬁnancial institutions to property developers in Thailand totalled 523 billion
baht in 1995, up from 436 in 1994 and 264 billion baht in 1993. By the end of June, 1996,
the loans reached 768 billion baht (Parnssonthorn, 1996).
6There might be little rooms for the developers to lower the housing prices because of
high costs of production.
7See Terdudomtham (1997).
2and very soon, with the participation of currency speculators, capital ﬂight
became unmanageable. This bank-run type capital outﬂow became so huge
that eventually the central bank of Thailand could no longer defend the
baht.8
Observing the troubles in the Thai housing market is straightforward, but
explaining them is much more diﬃcult. This paper attempts to do that with
a simple model, which is based on the following assumptions and features of
the sector and the economy. First, growth of the economy has created rising
demand on housing, which then led to rising housing prices and production.
Second, because construction of housing takes some time, developers face
uncertainty about the conditions of the market in the future at the time they
choose to start the housing projects. Third, nearly uninterrupted periods
of growth with high rates have made developers overoptimistic. Fourth, the
liberalization of the capital market as a result of the Bangkok International
Banking Facilities in 1992 at a time when the sector was overheated and
when foreign loans were available at low interest rates had led to a sharp rise
in external debts. Fifth, the pegging of the baht over a long period of time
has given people the false sense of security so that most of the external loans
raised were denominated in foreign currencies such as the yen and the dollar,
and that little, if any, hedging against exchange risks has been done. The de-
valuation of the baht has led to huge capital loss of the ﬁnancial institutions,
but shortly before the actual devaluation, there had been an expectation by
many people of one in the near future, prompting many people to convert
their domestic ﬁnancial assets to foreign currency. The latter action led to
further drainage of the stocks of foreign reserves held by the central bank,
thus deepening the crisis. Sixth, the ﬁnancial squeeze on lending by the
central bank in 1995 has worsen the cash ﬂow problems of the developers
at a time when they had diﬃculty in selling all the properties developed.
Seventh, the collapse of the housing market, marked by company failure and
bankruptcy, created bad loans and hardship to the ﬁnancial system, making
the repayment of external debts diﬃcult.9
We characterize the overoptimism in housing properties as bubbles.A
more explicit explanation of the concept of bubbles used in this paper will be
given later. Also given later is an explanation of why bubbles were formed.
8For more information about the housing market in Thailand, see, for example, Renand,
et. al. (1998) and Wong (1998).
9For a model that explains the crisis in South Korea using herding behavior, see Wong
(2000).
3Other than the existence of uncertainties in the market and economy, we
use a concept called herd behavior, which describes the tendency of people’s
a c t i o n st of o l l o wt h o s et a k e nb ys o m eo t h e r ss ot h a tt h e yt e n dt oa c ta sa
herd. Herding can take the extreme form that people make decisions simply
based on the observed actions of others, rather than on their own private
information.
Herding is not a new concept in the economics literature. Keynes’ beauty
contest is a famous example,10 but this concept has also been applied to
other areas such as investment.11 Our model is similar in many ways to that
used by Scharfstein and Stein (1990). One basic feature of the present model
is that there are so many uncertainties that investors do not make their
investment decisions based solely on the private information they possess.
Instead, investors ﬁnd it better to follow the investment decisions of other
people. What is important is that it could be rational for people to herd,
instead of being guided by the private information they possess.12
In this paper, we construct a simple model to show the relationship be-
tween economic growth, herding, excess supply, growth and collapse of the
housing market, and a ﬁnancial crisis. Our model is built on the features
of a housing market described above, and is used to illustrate how previ-
ous successes of the economy and the market could lead to overproduction
of housing, thus increasing the riskiness and vulnerability of the investment
projects. We argue that the longer the period of growth the market experi-
e n c e s ,t h em o r ev u l n e r a b l ef u t u r ep r o j e c t sm a yb e c o m e .
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the main
features of the model. We focus on the case before the economy takes oﬀ,a
steady state in which the conditions of the economy remain stationary over
time. In Section 3, we consider a shock to the housing market caused by
an unexpected growth of the economy. This raises the demand for housing
in certain states of nature, but at the same time makes the future demand
uncertain. We explain how ﬁrms choose their output, assuming that some
ﬁrms are optimistic about the future but some ﬁrms are pessimistic. In
Section 4, we explain what losses ﬁrms may expect to get in bad times. In
Section 5, we investigate how ﬁrms may become more optimistic if the good
10It is said that in a beauty contest, judges usually give scores based on the scores
they guess other judges are going to give instead of on how well they think about the
participants.
11See Devenow and Welch (1996), and Saxena and Wong (2000) for two recent surveys.
12See, for example, Calvo and Mendoza (1998), and Devenow and Welch (1996).
4state happens. We explain why herd behavior can lead to overoptimism about
the market conditions in the future. In Section 6, we explain how bubbles
may be formed, and how overoptimism may increase the vulnerability of
many ﬁr m sa n dt h em a r k e t .S e c t i o n7e x t e n d st h em o d e lt oo n ew i t hm u l t i p l e
periods or one in which the conditions of a good state get improved over time.
The last section concludes.
2 The Model: The Pre-growth Situation
Consider a competitive housing market in an economy.13 For simplicity,
assume that housing is a homogeneous product, and that the market is small
in the economy so that the rest of the economy can be taken as given. The
economy is connected to the world ﬁnancial markets so that domestic ﬁrms
and individuals have access to foreign loans. Housing, however, is a non-
tradable good.
The economy initially is in a stationary state, but then it starts to take
oﬀ, causing a possible rise in the demand for housing. In this section, we
introduce the major features of the present model, with a focus on the initial
stationary state. The time subindex is suppressed in this section. Denote
the demand for housing by the following function,
p = h
b(D), (1)
where p i st h em a r k e tp r i c e ,a n dD is the quantity demanded. [Ignore the
superscript “b” for the time being.] It is assumed that hb0(D) < 0, where a
prime denotes a derivative. The demand function is illustrated in Figure 1 by
the downward sloping schedule labeled hb. This demand function is publicly
known.
There are 2n competitive ﬁrms supplying housing, where n is a large
number and is ﬁxed in the present analysis. All ﬁrms have identical tech-
nology and are facing the same set of input and output prices. Each ﬁrm
employs labor (and possibly other inputs) to produce housing according to
13The Thai construction sector is relatively quite competitive, with a large number of
small companies. For example, there were nearly 10,400 construction ﬁrms in the country
by the end of 1994, and most of them are small, Thai-owned enterprises, with only a few






where qi is the output of ﬁrm i, `i is the labor input, and the production
function f(`i) is twice diﬀerentiable, and strictly increasing and concave; i.e.,
f0 > 0 and f00 < 0.14
Denote the prevailing wage rate by w, which for simplicity is assumed to
be ﬁxed in the present analysis. In addition, there is a ﬁxed cost, F (possibly
due to other inputs not considered explicitly in the present paper), which is
the same for every ﬁrm. However, the production process takes one period
to complete. While the ﬁrms receive revenue after selling the output in the
housing market, they have to hire the workers and pay the variable and ﬁxed
costs, w`i+F, one period in advance. Such non-synchronization of payments
and receipts means a cash ﬂow problem for each ﬁr m .I ti sa s s u m e dt h a tt o
cover the costs the ﬁrm borrows money in any period from an international
capital market at an exogenously given interest rate r. In the next period,
the total repayment of the loan is equal to (w`i+F)(1+r). The future value




i + F)(1 + r). (3)
The ﬁrm is supposed to choose, at the time the housing project is to start,
the optimal amount of labor to maximize its (future value of) proﬁt, taking
the prices as constant. The ﬁrst-order condition, using condition (2) and
assuming an interior solution, is
pf
0(`
i)=w(1 + r), (4)
which can be rearranged to give the demand for labor:
`
i = g(p;w,r). (5)
Note that with identical technologies, all ﬁrms make the same production
decision. Because the production function is strictly concave in labor input,
the second-order condition is satisﬁed:
∂2πi
∂(`i)2 = pf
00 < 0. (6)
14For simplicity, we assume that labor is the only variable input. All other inputs are
assumed to be ﬁxed and are ignored in the production function.
6It is easy to show that the labor demand is increasing in p but decreasing in w
and r.15 The optimal output is then given by the following supply function:
q
i = φ
i(p;w,r) ≡ f(g(p;w,r)), (7)





The output function given in (7) can be substituted into equation (3) to ex-





i(p;w,r) is increasing and convex in p, but decreasing in w and
r.16
When given input prices, the market supply function in (8) is illustrated
in Figure 1 by the upward sloping schedule EG plus portion of the vertical
axis OR.17 We assume that the minimum point of the average cost schedule
of a representative ﬁr m( n o ts h o w ni nt h eﬁgure) corresponds to price level
p0, which is the height of point E. This means that to have output from the
ﬁrms, the market price has to be at least p0.18 This critical price level can be
obtained from the proﬁt function given by (9):
θ
i(p0;w,r)=0 . (10)




i > 0. (11)
15Totally diﬀerentiate (4) to give
pf00(`i)d`i + f0(`i)dp =( 1+r)dw + wdr.
Rearranging the terms will give the result.
16The proﬁt function is used in ﬁelds like international trade, where it is called the
revenue function, GNP function, or GDP function. For the properties of a GDP function,
see, for example, Wong (1995).
17Since the labor demand depends positively on the market price of output, so does the
output.
18We assume that ﬁrms do not produce if the expected proﬁt is negative.
7The dependence of the ﬁrm’s proﬁt on the price is illustrated graphically
in Figure 2. Schedule ABC, which is called the proﬁt curve of a representative
ﬁrm, shows the dependence of the ﬁrm’s maximum proﬁt (when positive) on
the market price. This schedule has the following properties: It is increasing
and convex, and cuts the horizontal axis at a positive price, p0. In other
words, the proﬁto ft h eﬁrm is positive if the market price is greater than p0
and is zero, with no output, if p ≤ p0.
The market equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 1. It is represented by
the point of intersection, E, between the demand curve hb and the aggregate




which is used to solve for the equilibrium output, Q0. The equilibrium can
then be used to solve for the equilibrium price, p0. In the case shown, the
ﬁrms earn zero proﬁt at the equilibrium. In such a stationary economy, the
equilibrium of the housing market remains unchanged over time, until some
shocks arise.
3T h e T a k e - O ﬀ
Consider a period labeled period 0. Up to the beginning of this period, the
market has been stationary, with the equilibrium represented by point E in
Figure 1. There are 2n ﬁrms, each of which earns zero proﬁt.
Just before the ﬁrms choose the optimal labor input for producing housing
in period 0, it is known to everyone that the economy has taken oﬀ (but
not known before this period); i.e., it is growing.19 This shock, which will
aﬀect the equilibrium of the housing market, is described by the following
assumptions:
( i ) G r o w t ho ft h ee c o n o m yi se x p e c t e dt ol e a dt oa ni n c r e a s ei nt h ed e m a n d
for housing.
(ii) There are two possible states of nature in period 1: “good” state and
“bad” state. The probability of having the good state in period 1 is
ρ while that of having the bad state is (1 − ρ), ρ ∈ (0,1). If the good
19In other words, the shock is a surprising one so that no ﬁrm will change its output
before period 0.
8state occurs, the demand function for housing is given by p
g
1 = hg(D1)
while that in the bad state is pb
1 = hb(D1), with hg(D1) >h b(D1) for
all D1 > 0, where D1 is the aggregate production chosen by the ﬁrms.
Both demands depend negatively on the price. For convenience, we
further assume that the demand in the bad state is the same as that
in the initial stationary state.20
(iii) The growth of the economy and the demand functions in the two states
are public information, but the value of ρ is unknown to the public.
The assumption that ρ is unknown to everyone can be justiﬁed by the fact
that growth of an emerging economy usually involves many new uncertain-
ties. During the early stages of a take-oﬀ, people have little experience and
knowledge about the nature of the growth. In particular, because probability
i sn o to b s e r v a b l ea n db e c a u s et h e r ea r en o tt o om a n yp a s to b s e r v a t i o n s ,i ti s
diﬃcult to have a reliable (with a small standard deviation) estimate of the
probability of any state.
In period 0, all ﬁrms receive a signal, and based on that signal they
estimate the value of ρ. For simplicity, we assume that there are two groups
of ﬁrms, n of them in each group, which can be labeled type-α and type-
β ﬁrms (or α-ﬁrms and β-ﬁrms), respectively. An α-ﬁrm believes that the
probability of the good state in period 1 is ρα
1 ∈ (0,1) while a β-ﬁrm thinks
that the good-state probability is ρ
β




are therefore optimists and the β-ﬁrms are pessimists in terms of what they
think of the chance of the good state in the next period.] There can be many
reasons why the ﬁrms have diﬀerent beliefs of the good-state probability; for
example, they may have received diﬀerent signals, or they have managers
of diﬀerent characters.21 As a result, even though all ﬁrms have the same
technologies, having diﬀerent beliefs of the good-state probability implies
that they generally will choose diﬀerent production plans.22
20This assumption, which is made for simplicity, explains the superscript “b”i nf u n c t i o n
hb(D) introduced in the previous section.
21For example, Scharfstein and Stein (1990) distinguish between “good” and “bad”
signals, and between “smart” and “dumb” managers. However, it is beyond the scope of





22It will be more general if we assume a continuum of ﬁrms that are ranked by the
degree of optimism about the good-state probability. In the present model, assuming only




1 a r ep u b l i ci n f o r m a t i o n ,e v e n though they are determined
privately. The question one may ask is whether herding may exist in this
period. It may, but this does not mean that ρα
1 is necessarily equal to ρ
β
1, at
least not in this period. First, it is not likely that full herding exists in the
ﬁrst period. Second, there are equal number of ﬁrms in each group. They are
symmetric, and there is no good reason to predict whether α-ﬁrms will revise
ρα close to ρβ or the other way around. Third, herding eﬀects are usually
more powerful when one can observe the actions of others. This means that
herding eﬀect could be more powerful in later periods when diﬀerences in
optimism lead to diﬀerent actions and rewards.
Based on the predicted price levels in the two states and the ﬁrms’ sub-
jective beliefs of the good-state probability, the expected price level in period












where i = α, β.
Assuming risk neutrality, each ﬁrm in period 0 has to choose the optimal










0 + F)(1 + r). (14)
A comparison of equations (3) and (14) shows that, assuming a non-negative
expected proﬁt, the new demand for labor by ﬁrm i in period 0 is equal to
`
i
0 = g(e p
i
1;w,r), (15)






1;w,r) ≡ f(g(e p
i
1;w,r)). (16)
Because of the positive relationship between probability and the expected
price, when given the price level in each state, an increase in optimism will







1 ≥ 0, all α-ﬁrms will have positive outputs.23 The β-
ﬁrms, however, may or may not have positive outputs. In terms of the output
chosen by the β-ﬁrms, three cases can be distinguished:
23To see this point, suppose that the bad state occurs. Since the market is shown to be
big enough to support all the ﬁrms, it is certainly big enough for the optimistic α-ﬁrms.
In the good state, the demand is higher, meaing that the market is big enough to support
at least all α-ﬁrms.
10(a) All β-ﬁrms are producing a positive output.
(b) Some β-ﬁrms are producing a positive output but some β-ﬁrms are
producing nothing.
(c) All β-ﬁrms are producing nothing.
These three cases are analyzed separately below. Note that we use Q1 to
represent the aggregate output in period 1 in general, but use Q
j
1 to represent
the equilibrium output in case (j), j = a, b, c, which will be discussed below.
3.1 Case (a)
















The equilibrium of the housing market is described by
Q1 = D1. (18)
The two equations in (13), two equations in (16), equation (17), and equation






1,Q 1, and D1.
This equilibrium can be solved in a simple way. Using the equations of
the expected price functions, (13), and the equilibrium condition (18), the





















It is easy to show that function σi is decreasing in Q1.24 The equilibrium



















1hg0 +( 1− ρi
1)hb0¤
< 0.
11In Figure 3, nσα(Q1;ρα
1,w,r) as a function of Q1 is shown by schedule AB.
The values of function nσβ(Q1;ρ
β
1,w,r) are added vertically to AB, giving
schedule CD. The equilibrium output is depicted by the intersection point
between schedule CD and a 45◦-line from the origin, shown as point E. Let
this output be Qa
1. Once the aggregate output is known, all other variables
can be derived in a simple way. In particular, the market price and the
proﬁto fe a c hﬁrm in each state can be derived. In order for the β-ﬁrms to
be willing to produce in this case, the resulting expected proﬁto fe a c ho f
them is non-negative. Another schedule, A*B*, is also shown in Figure 3. It
represents function 2nσα(Q1;ρα
1,w,r) and is constructed so that its vertical
height is twice that of schedule AB. Obviously, schedule CD lies between
schedules AB and A*B*.
The market equilibrium can also be shown in Figure 4. Given the demand
in the two states, the expected demand perceived by α-ﬁrms (β-ﬁrms) is
illustrated by schedule ˜ hα (˜ hβ). Because α-ﬁrms are more optimistic than
β-ﬁrms, schedule ˜ hα is higher than schedule ˜ hβ. Schedule HJ (plus segment
OR of the vertical axis) represents the supply of all α-ﬁrms or all β-ﬁrms.
Since the two types of ﬁrms have the same number and same technologies,
HJ horizontally bisects the space between the vertical axis and schedule EG.
With an output of Qa
1 of the sector, the equilibrium price in the good (bad)
state in period 1 is equal to p
g
1 (pb
1). This means that the expected price
perceived by α-ﬁrms (β-ﬁrms) is equal to ˜ pα
1 (˜ p
β
1), and they choose to produce









We now turn to case (b) in which some of the β-ﬁr m sc h o o s en o tt op r o d u c e .
Denote the number of β-ﬁrms with a positive output in equilibrium by m,
where 0 <m<n .This case is similar to case (a), except that all the β-ﬁrms
with a positive output have zero expected proﬁt. Denote the expected price
perceived by β-ﬁrms by e p
β
1. In other words,
e π
β














(1 + r)=0 . (21)
Since there are some β-ﬁr m st h a tc h o o s en o tt op r o d u c e ,t h ee x p e c t e dp r i c e
e p
β












12Two equations in (13), two equations in (16), equation (18), and equation




1,m ,Q 1, and D1.
This equilibrium can be solved in a simple, recursive way. First, the
expected price e p
β
1 (= p0) is used to give q
β
1 by (16), and to yield D1 and
Q1 by (13) and (18). Denote the equilibrium quantity by Qb
1. Once D1 is
known, equation (13) gives e pα
1, which is then used to calculate qα
1. Equation
(22) gives the number of β-ﬁrms that have positive outputs.
3.3 Case (c)
We now turn to case (c), in which none of the β-ﬁrms has any incentive to
produce anything. The simplest approach to analyzing this case is to derive
the critical value of these ﬁrms’ expectation of the good-state probability,
ρc
1, which is the maximum perceived good-state probability with which all
β-ﬁrms have no incentive to produce anything.







Equation (23) can be solved for the equilibrium output, which is denoted by
Qc
1. Graphically, it can be solved by using Figure 3. Schedule AB represents
nσα(Q1;ρα
1,w,r), and the equilibrium output is then depicted by the point of
intersection, F, between schedule AB and the 45◦-line. This output, α-ﬁrms’
perceived good-state probability, ρα
1, and condition (13) can be used to solve
for the ﬁrms’ expected price level in period 1.
For β-ﬁrms, we want to determine the maximum good-state probability ρc
1
with which they choose to produce nothing. With this perceived probability,







which can be solved for the corresponding expected price, e p
β
1. The critical
















The equilibrium in this case can be illustrated in Figure 5. Schedule ˜ hα
shows the expected demand perceived by the α-ﬁrms, while HJ is the sup-
ply schedule of the α-ﬁrms. The market output is given by the intersection
13between these two schedules, and is denoted by Qc
1. This output leads to
a market price of p
g
1 (pb
1) if the good (bad) state occurs in period 1. The
expected price perceived by the α-ﬁr m si se q u a lt o˜ pα
1. Following the above
analysis, we want to determine the maximum good-state probability per-
ceived by the β-ﬁrms so that all of them choose to produce nothing. Recall
that if the expected price is less than p0, β-ﬁrms will produce no output in
the long run. Thus making use of the price levels in the two states and p0,
we can determine the corresponding good-state probability, ρc
1, from which
we can construct the expected demand curve perceived by the β-ﬁrms, ˜ hβ.




1 < 0, at least some β-ﬁrms will have a positive output. Sup-
pose that ρc
1 ≥ ρα
1. By its deﬁnition, the β-ﬁrms will be induced to produce
something, and condition (24) will be violated. This is a contradiction.




Proof. This proposition follows from the result that the α-ﬁrms have a
higher expected price than the β-ﬁrms have, and that the output is an in-
creasing function of the expected price.
4T h e L o s s e s
We now turn to period 1. In the beginning of this period, housing production
by all optimistic ﬁrms and possibly some or all pessimistic ﬁr m si sc o m p l e t e d .
The state of nature is revealed and the demand is known, depending on which
state occurs. The equilibrium in the housing market is then achieved. After
receiving revenue from the sale of housing, the ﬁrms repay the loan.
What state occurs has important consequences. We analyze the eﬀects
of each of the two states separately. In this section, we assume that the bad
state occurs in period 1 and examine the consequences.
Proposition 3 (a) Whether in period 0 the β-ﬁrms have chosen to produce,
pb
1 ≤ p0.( b )I fρβ > 0, then pb
1 <p 0.
Proof. (a) Suppose that pb
1 >p 0. Since the demand in a good state is higher
than in a bad state, p
g
1 >p b
1, meaning that the expected price faced by all
14ﬁrms is greater than p0, and that all ﬁrms will have an output greater than
in period 0, i.e., Q1 >Q 0. However, an increase in output implies a decrease
in the price level in the bad state, or pb
1 <p 0, contradicting the earlier
assumption. (b) Suppose that ρβ > 0. We want to argue that pb
1 = p0 can
be ruled out. To see why, suppose pb
1 = p0. This implies that all β-ﬁrms will
have an expected price greater than p0 and will produce an output greater
than in period 0, implying again that Q1 >Q 0 and pb
1 <p 0, contradicting to
the assumption of pb
1 = p0.
This proposition states that the price level in the bad state is lower than
the price level before growth.25 It has important implications on the proﬁts
of the ﬁrms in the bad state, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the bad state occurs in period 1. (a) All α-ﬁrms
earn a negative proﬁt. (b) The proﬁto faβ-ﬁrm is non-positive and its loss,
i ft h e r ei sa n y ,i sl e s st h a nt h a to fa nα-ﬁrm. (c) The proﬁto faβ-ﬁrm is
zero if it is not producing or if its perceived good-state probability is zero and
pb
1 = p0.









0 + F)(1 + r), (26)
where i = α, β. By Proposition 2 and because a ﬁrm earns zero proﬁtb e f o r e
growth, the bad-state proﬁto fa n yα-ﬁrm as given by (26) is negative. In
other words, an α-ﬁrm can expect to receive a negative proﬁti nt h eb a d
state, even though the expected proﬁt, which the ﬁrm maximizes in period
0, may be positive.
( b )F o rt h es a m er e a s o n ,t h ep r o ﬁto faβ-ﬁrm is non-positive when the
bad state occurs. Since an α-ﬁrm has a production higher than that of a
β-ﬁrm (Proposition 2), and since proﬁt is strictly concave in labor input, the
loss of an α-ﬁr mi nt h eb a ds t a t em u s tb eg r e a t e rt h a nt h a to faβ-ﬁrm.
(c) The bad-state proﬁto faβ-ﬁrm is obviously zero if it is not producing
anything in period 0. Alternatively, suppose that its good-state probability
is zero and that pb
1 = p0. In this case, the β-ﬁrms are fully prepared for the
bad state. Its expected price in period 0 is pb
1 = p0. So if it does produce in
25Even if ρ
β
1 =0 , the period-1 price level can still be lower than that before growth.
15period 0, its expected proﬁt is zero. If the bad state does occur in period 1,
its realized proﬁti sz e r o . 26
By this proposition, if the bad state occurs, β-ﬁrms are glad to have been
pessimistic.
The proﬁto fa nα-ﬁrm can be illustrated by the proﬁtc u r v eA B Ci n
Figure 2. In period 0 at the time when the production decision is made, the
ﬁrm expects to make a proﬁt equal to point B, as the expected price in the
next period is equal to e pα
1. Line KBI is tangent to the proﬁtc u r v ea tp o i n t
B. By equation (11), the slope of KBI is equal to the output chosen, qα
1. In
period 1, the state is revealed, and the price is p
g
1 if the good state occurs,
or pb
1 if the bad state occurs.
The proﬁt curve shows the proﬁto fa nα-ﬁrm at diﬀerent prices under
the condition that the output (and labor) is chosen optimally. The output
that the ﬁrm can supply to the market, qα
1, w a sc h o s e ni np e r i o d0a tat i m e
when the actual price in period 1 is not known. Because the realized price
is not the same as the expected price in any state (unless the good-state
probability is equal to either 1 or 0), the realized proﬁti sd i ﬀerent from what








0 + F)(1 + r), (27)
where qα
1 and `α
0 are predetermined parameters in period 1. Equation (27) is
illustrated by line KBI. If the market price is p
g
1 (pb
1), the proﬁt is depicted
by point K (I). As Proposition 3 shows, the proﬁto fa no p t i m i s t i cﬁrm is
negative if the bad state occurs.
What would happen if a ﬁrm receives a loss? The following options may
be available to the ﬁrm: (i) to draw on previous proﬁts to cover the loss; (ii)
to raise further loans in the capital market; and (iii) to declare bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy generates externality to the rest of the economy, and could be
costly to a ﬁrm.27 If the loss is not of signiﬁcant amount, and if it is of
short-run nature, the ﬁrm may be able to aﬀord it, which may be covered
with previous savings or new loans.
26Of course, if the good state occurs, its realized proﬁt is positive. In this case, all β-
ﬁrms know that their initial belief of the value of the good-state probability is completely
wrong.
27It is beyond the scope of this paper to model the cost of bankruptcy explicitly.
165T h e H e r d i n g E ﬀects
We now examine the consequence if the good state occurs in period 1, and
then try to go beyond period 1. For the time being, we assume that the
demand conditions in period 2 remain exactly the same as those in the pre-
vious period: The demand for housing in the good and bad states are given
by p2 = hg(D2) and p2 = hb(D2), respectively, where D2 is the quantity.
The cost structures and the good-state probability also remain unchanged.
All these pieces of information are known to everyone, except again that as
before, the good-state probability ρ is unknown to all.
Proposition 5 Suppose that the good state occurs in period 1. (a) All ﬁrms
with a positive output earns positive proﬁt. (b) An α-ﬁrm earns more than a
β-ﬁrm does.
Proof. (a) The proﬁto faﬁrm in the good state, in which the market price
is at p
g









0 + F)(1 + r), (28)
where i = α, β. Since the expected proﬁto faﬁrm is non-negative, and since
the market price in the good state is higher than the expected price, the
proﬁti n( 2 8 )i sp o s i t i v ei ft h eo u t p u ti sp o sitive. (b) It is clear that should
a ﬁrm know that the market price is as high as p
g
1, it would want to produce
more. Since an α-ﬁrm has an output higher than that of a β-ﬁrm, and since
the proﬁt is strictly concave in labor input, an α-ﬁrm must has a higher
proﬁt. Note that the proﬁto faβ-ﬁrm may be zero.




1 . Graphically, the proﬁto fa nα-ﬁrm in the
good state, π
αg
1 , is depicted by point K in Figure 2. These two realized proﬁt
levels are known to all the ﬁrms.
The ﬁrms then start to choose the optimal labor input for a new produc-
tion to be completed in period 2. If each ﬁrm maintains the same good-state
probability as before, and since the demand and technology conditions re-
main unchanged, it will choose the same labor input.
In this paper, we assume that the β-ﬁrms, after noticing that good state
occurs in period 1, will revise upward their good-state probability. This is
the herding eﬀect we mentioned earlier. In the present context, two reasons
can be introduced to explain the existence of herding. First, the β-ﬁrms note
17that their proﬁts are less than those of the α-ﬁrms. They may regret that
they have not invested more. In particular, in the special case in which their
perceived good-state probability is zero, they know that they have made a
mistake. Even if their perceived good-state probability is positive, they may
feel that they have underestimated the probability of the good state. It is
then reasonable for them to revise their estimated good-state probability
upward. The β-ﬁrm may feel even more strongly after a long series of good
states, as these Asian countries experienced before the crisis.
Second, for many ﬁrms, the production decisions are made by managers
or executives. Very often the performance of a manager is measured in terms
of not just by how much proﬁth em a k e s ,b u ta l s ob yh o wt h ep r o ﬁti s
compared with the proﬁts made by similar ﬁrms. A manager hates to make
ap r o ﬁt substantially less than what his ﬁrm’s competitors are making. On
the other hand, if everyone else is making a loss, making a loss will appear
to be more acceptable. Because of this feature, managers tend to constantly
revise their prediction so that they would not appear to be too far away from
other managers’ prediction. In the present model, the herding eﬀect for the
managers is assumed to be stronger in period 1 with the good state than in
period 0, because in period 1 with the good state the proﬁts of the α-ﬁrms
are higher than those of the β-ﬁrms.
In this paper, the herding eﬀe c ti sc a p t u r e db ya s s u m i n gt h a ti np e r i o d1
the pessimistic β-ﬁrms replace their initial perceived good-state probability
with that of the α-ﬁrms, while the latter retain their initial perceived good-
state probability. As a result, all the ﬁrms have the same expectation of the
good-state probability in period 2, which is the same as ρα
1. All ﬁrms now
become identical, not just in technology but also in what they think about
the probability of the good state in the next period.28 No superscript to
identify the ﬁrms is needed in this and the next sections.
Based on the perceived good-state probability, all ﬁrms choose the opti-
mal labor input in period 1, with the costs of labor and possibly other inputs
covered by loans from banks or other ﬁnancial intermediaries. The equilib-
rium of the market can be described by the following equations. First, the
28The assumption that full herding exists in this period is made for simplicity. A more
realistic, but more complicated, model is to assume a multi-period model to analyze how
gradual herding exists and to explain how pessimistic ﬁrms are getting more optimistic
over time as the economy is growing. We believe that the simple model described here is
good enough to bring out the points we want to make.
18output of each ﬁrm is:
q2 = φ(e p2;w,r)=f(g(e p2;w,r)), (29)
where the expected price e p2 is deﬁned by
e p2 ≡ ρ2h
g(D2)+( 1− ρ2)h
b(D2). (30)
The total supply is given by
Q2 =2 nφ(e p2;w,r), (31)
which in equilibrium is equal to demand,
Q2 = D2. (32)
Equations (29) to (32) can be solved for the four unknowns: q2, e p2,Q 2, and
D2.









which can be solved for the aggregate output, Q2.
Graphically, the equilibrium can be obtained from Figure 1. As explained,
schedule EG describes the supply of housing by all the ﬁr m sa saf u n c t i o no f
the market price (in the stationary state) or expected price, if all ﬁrms have
the same expectation of the good-state probability. Based on the good-state
probability perceived by all ﬁrms, the expected demand schedule ˜ h can be
constructed. The market equilibrium is the point of intersection, K, between
the expected demand schedule and the aggregate supply schedule EG. The
corresponding price levels p
g
2 and pb
2 in the two states and the expected price
˜ p2 a r es h o w ni nt h ed i a g r a m . 29 For comparison purpose, points A and D from
Figure 4, which show the equilibrium when the β-ﬁrms are not so optimistic,
are also shown.
Proposition 6 Q1 <Q 2 < 2Q1.
29This equilibrium can also be illustrated in Figure 3. By construction, schedule A*B*
i st w i c ea sh i g ha ss c h e d u l eA B ,a n dt h u sr e p r e s e n t sf u n c t i o n2nσ(Q1;ρ2,w,r). The equi-
librium output is represented by the interesecting points between schedule A*B* and a
45◦-line from the origin.
19Proof. Refer to Figure 3. The equilibrium in period 1 is at point F if only
α-ﬁrms produces, or point E if all ﬁrms are producing, or somewhere between
Ea n dFi fa l lα-ﬁrms and some β-ﬁrms produce. In period 2, when all ﬁrms
are equally optimistic about the future so that all have the same output, the
market equilibrium is at point H. It is clear from the diagram that Q2 >Q 1
whether none, some, or all β-ﬁrms produce. To show the second inequality
in the proposition, note that by construction, JF = FG. Construct point I
on the 45◦-line so that GI is a horizontal line. Geometrically, GI = GF = FJ
= OJ, and so FI = OF. This means that the output corresponding to point
I will be twice the output Qc
1. However, because schedule A∗B∗ is strictly
downward sloping, its intersection with the 45◦-line, point H, is lower than
point I. Since H is the equilibrium point in period 2, the diagram shows that
2Qc
1 >Q 2. So the second inequality in the proposition holds in case (c) with
only α-ﬁrms producing. If some or all β-ﬁrms are producing, the period-1
output is higher and the same inequality holds, too.
The ﬁrst inequality in the above proposition is intuitive because of the
increase in the production of the β-ﬁrms. The second inequality puts an







Proof. This proposition follows from the ﬁrst inequality in the previous
proposition.
The previous two propositions suggest that the increase in the aggregate
supply due to an increase in optimism of the type-β ﬁrms has lowered the
market price in either state. This will aﬀect the proﬁto ft h eα-ﬁrms.
6 The Bubbles
This section examines how herding aﬀects the proﬁts of the ﬁrms in period
2. First of all, let us deﬁne a term to be used below: vulnerability of a ﬁrm.
Recall that the condition of the market is unknown at the time a ﬁrm chooses
its output based on the expected demand. Thus the realized proﬁto ft h eﬁrm
depends on what state to occur in the next period. It is therefore possible
that a ﬁrm may face a loss if the realized proﬁti sn e g a t i v ew h e nab a ds t a t e
20occurs.30 Such a possible loss makes the ﬁrm vulnerable, and in the present
model its vulnerability is measured in terms of the loss when the bad state
occurs in the next period. The vulnerability of a market is the total losses
of all the ﬁrms when the bad state occurs.
6.1 Vulnerability of the α-ﬁrms
We ﬁrst focus on the proﬁts of the α-ﬁrms. Since the herding eﬀect causes a
rise in the aggregate supply and thus a drop in the price level in each state,
the expected price level of all ﬁrms, e p2, is less than e pα
1. This causes each
α-ﬁrm to have an output level less than that in period 1. The new price level
is shown in Figure 2, with the corresponding expected proﬁt represented by
p o i n tAo nt h ep r o ﬁt schedule. As explained, the slope of the proﬁt schedule
at point A represents the output of an α-ﬁrm. With this output level (and
the corresponding labor input) chosen, the realized proﬁta ta n ya c t u a lp r i c e
level is given by line HGAJ, which has an equation given by:
π2 = p2q2 − (w`1 + F)(1 + r),
where q2 and `1 were chosen before period 2. If the good (bad) state occurs
so that the equilibrium price level is equal to p
g
2 (pb
2), the realized proﬁto f





2q2 − (w`1 + F)(1 + r), (34)
where j = g, b. In Figure 2, if the good (bad) state occurs, the proﬁti s
depicted by point J (H). It is clear from the diagram that with the herding
eﬀect, the proﬁto fa nα-ﬁrm in the good state is less than that without the
herding eﬀect. This result is intuitive because of a drop in the good-state
price and the output level.
Since the purpose of this paper is to explain a ﬁnancial crisis, let us say
something more about the bad state. We ﬁrst ask the question, does the
herding eﬀect make the ﬁrm (and also the market) more vulnerable? To
answer this question, we can ﬁrst compare the bad-state proﬁts of an α-ﬁrm











1) − w(`1 − `
α
0)(1 + r). (35)
30That does not mean that the ﬁrm is irrational. It is because the risk-neutral ﬁrm
chooses its production based on expected proﬁt.
21The diﬀerence between the two proﬁts as given in (35) is represented by the
vertical gap between points I and H, or EF, in Figure 2. In general, the sign
of this diﬀerence is ambiguous, meaning that the herding eﬀect may increase
or decrease the loss of an α-ﬁrm in the bad state. To see this eﬀect more





1q2 − (w`1 + F)(1 + r), (36)
which is the proﬁto fa nα-ﬁrm in a bad state in period 1 if it chooses the
production plan in period 2, (`1,q 2). In Figure 2, πb0
1 is represented by the
vertical height of point G, or OD (loss). The proﬁte ﬀect of the herding eﬀect



































c a nb ec a l l e dt h eoutput eﬀect, represented by FD. The
price eﬀect is negative, i.e., an increase in the loss, because the herding
eﬀect causes a drop in the price level. The output eﬀect is positive in this
case, because the herding eﬀect induces the ﬁrm to produce less, making
the investment less risky. In the case shown in Figure 2, the output eﬀect
outweighs the price eﬀect, meaning that the ﬁrm gets a smaller loss in the
bad state because of the herding eﬀect.31
6.2 Vulnerability of the β-ﬁrms
We now turn to the β-ﬁrms. If the production of β-ﬁrm in period 0 is zero,
the herding eﬀect deﬁnitely has increased the ﬁrm’s vulnerability since its
proﬁt in the bad state in period 2 may be negative. We want to see whether
its vulnerability is unambiguously higher with the herding eﬀect even if it
produces a positive output in period 0. To do that, we need to determine





















(1 + r). (38)
As done before, the change in its proﬁt as given by (38) can be disaggregated






















31It is possible to show another case in which the price eﬀect outweighs the output eﬀect.
22where, as deﬁned earlier, πb0
1 is the hypothetical proﬁti faﬁrm in the bad
state in period 1 chooses the production decision (`1,q 2). We showed that the
price eﬀect is negative because of the drop in the bad-state price. The output
eﬀect for a β-ﬁrm is also negative, because the herding eﬀect has caused the
ﬁrm to produce more, while the ﬁrm would produce less should it be known
in the previous period that the bad state is going to occur in period 1. We
conclude that the herding eﬀect, which is due to the increase in optimism of
the β-ﬁrms, has increased their vulnerability in the next period.
6.3 Vulnerability of the market
We showed that the herding eﬀect may hurt or improve the vulnerability of
the α-ﬁrms, but will deﬁnitely hurt that of the β-ﬁrms. We now want to
show how it may aﬀect the vulnerability of the market as a whole.32


































As we did before, this change in proﬁt can be disaggregated into the price




































The previous analysis shows that the price eﬀe c ti sn e g a t i v ef o rb o t ht y p e s


































(1 + r). (40)
Proposition 6 shows that the aggregate output in period 2 is greater than that
in period 1, i.e., 2q2 >q α
1 +q
β
1. Since there are losses in the bad state, Propo-
sition 6 suggests that the market has over-invested in period 2. Consider the
32Of course, if the herding eﬀect hurts the vulnerability of the α-ﬁrms as well, it will



















































period 0 (production completed in period 1), if they can coordinate their




0 may not be eﬃcient; the second inequality is due to over-
investment in period 1 (production completed in period 2). The second
i n e q u a l i t yi n( 4 1 )i m p l i e st h a tt h eo u t p u te ﬀect for the market as given
b y( 4 0 )i sn e g a t i v e . W en o ws u m m a r i z et h ea b o v er e s u l t sb yt h ef o l l o w i n g
proposition:
Proposition 8 Suppose that in period 1 all β-ﬁr m sb e c o m ea so p t i m i s t i ca s
the α-ﬁrms. (a) All α-ﬁrms may or may not become more vulnerable in the
sense that their loss in the bad state may or may not be higher than before.
(b) All β-ﬁrms are more vulnerable. (c) The market as a whole is more
vulnerable.
The increase in the vulnerability of the market shows the damage of the
herding eﬀect to the market and economy. However, the eﬀe c th u r t sn o tj u s t
the market, but also possibly the economy. We now introduce the following
concepts of bubbles. Speciﬁcally, in this paper we say that bubbles are formed
(1) when the ﬁrms are overoptimistic about the occurrence of good states
or overstate the conditions of good states; or
(2) when the total losses of the ﬁrms in the bad state are so huge that there
is a widespread bankruptcy, creating bad loans to the banks, and when
the economy as a whole has diﬃculty in repaying the loans borrowed
from abroad; or
(3) when the total losses of a suﬃcient percentage of the ﬁrms in the market
are so big that other parts of the economy are adversely aﬀected, caus-
ing signiﬁcant deterioration in the conﬁdence in the economy, capital
ﬂight, and speculative attacks on the currency.
24Criterion (1) refers to the case in which the ﬁrms (or other agents) put
too much weight on the possible occurrence of good states. In the present
model, bubbles are said to occur when the ﬁrms believe that the good-state
probability is greater than the actual probability, ρ2 > ρ. The diﬃculty of
applying this criterion to identify bubbles is that the actual probability, ρ, is
not observable.
There may exist special cases in which the market becomes so overheated
that many people easily conclude that widespread overoptimism occurs. To
these people, bubbles exist in the market. However, that does not mean that
people who invested under these conditions are irrational. In fact, it is quite
possible that more people, including rational ones, could keep on investing
despite the fact that the market has been over-heated. Some reasons can be
oﬀered to explain this phenomenon. First, many emerging economies took oﬀ
not too long ago before the crisis, and then experienced impressive but nearly
uninterrupted growth. This could easily make people get over-optimistic.
Second, people originally pessimistic could be inﬂuenced by the successes of
people who are more optimistic and aggressive in the past. They could very
well follow the crowd and become more optimistic and aggressive. In other
words, those aggressive and successful taught those pessimistic people to be
aggressive. Third, the system also works to encourage managers of ﬁrms to
be more aggressive in growing markets. They are afraid of making proﬁts
signiﬁcantly lower than those made by similar ﬁrms, while they fear less
about losses if similar ﬁrms are making similar losses. The last two points
a r ej u s tt h eh e r d i n ge ﬀect introduced above. Fourth, even if people know
that bubbles have been formed in the sense that the market is over-heated,
they could still want to invest, because they hope that they can get a proﬁt
before the bubbles burst. In this case, people know that there are bubbles,
but they just do not know when they will burst.
Criteria (1) is close to how bubbles are deﬁn e di nt h el i t e r a t u r e . F o r
example, Flood and Hodrick (1990: 88) wrote, “A bubble thus represents a
deviation of the current market price of the asset from the value implied by
market fundamentals.” In the present model, we say that a bubble is formed
when the subjective good-state probability is too high or when the conditions
of the future are overstated. However, the diﬃculty in forecasting a bubble
in the future based on the present deﬁnition and the Flood-Hodrick concept
is that they are based on some unobservable variables.
Criteria (2) and (3) are based more on observable variables during bad
states. For example, if the supply and demand in a bad state are know, it is
25possible to determine the loss a ﬁrm may receive if the bad state occurs, and
to determine the losses of all relevant ﬁrms. Bubbles are formed when these
losses are bigger than this market or the economy can absorb. In particular,
these losses can create negative externality to other parts of the economy.
O n em a ys a yt h a tf o rt h ee c o n o m yi tm a yb eb e a r a b l ei fo n l yaf e wﬁrms go
bankrupt, but is unbearable if widespread bankruptcy occurs.
These two criteria are based on the existence of externality in the housing
market, especially when widespread failure of ﬁrms arises. However, the
criteria lead to diﬀerent consequences. While criterion (2) emphasizes the
inability to repay foreign loans, criterion (3) focuses on currency speculation,
capital ﬂight, and currency crisis.
Note that these two criteria do not require the knowledge of the unob-
servable probabilities of states.33
7T h e C r a s h
In the previous section, we explained the formation of bubbles using a simple
model. In this section, we try to extend it in two directions: the existence of
more periods and an improvement in the conditions of the good state. These
extensions will give more insights into the crisis.
7.1 Multiperiods
What happens to the market and the economy when there are more than two
periods? The answer, as the above analysis shows, depends on what happens
in period 2. If the bad state occurs, then the ﬁrms get losses. If the good
state occurs, they receive proﬁts.34
The interesting case is the one in which both periods 1 and 2 are marked
by good states. These successes can boost the general level of optimism in
the market. First, the originally optimistic ﬁrms may be more aggressive.
Second, the originally not so optimistic ﬁrms may, due to the herding eﬀect
explained above, become more optimistic. As shown earlier, the rise in the
general level of optimism will encourage the ﬁrms to produce more, thus
33Criteria (2) and (3) do suggest that bubbles were formed in the Thai housing markets
prior to the crisis.
34A more complete analysis requires a multi-period model, but it is beyond the scope
of this paper. For the present purpose, only a qualitative analysis is provided here.
26lowering the price level in a bad state. As a result, the investment becomes
riskier because the losses in the bad state will be greater.
Many emerging markets are characterized by successive periods of good
states. We explained that these good states can make people overoptimistic
and too aggressive. As the number of periods of good states extends, the
vulnerability of the ﬁrms and the market increases. The losses of the ﬁrms
could be bigger the later a bad state occurs.
7.2 Better Good States
In the previous sections, it is assumed that the conditions of both states in
period 2 remain the same as in period 1. This assumption is limited because
it has not taken into account the fact that these emerging economies are
growing. It is now relaxed. To capture the feature that the economy is
growing, we assume that the good state becomes better in period 2 while the
bad state remains unchanged. However, the probability of the good state is
unchanged, and is also unknown to everyone.
































Q +( 1− ρ)hb0
i > 0. (43)
The sign of the derivative in (43) is not surprising, as an increase in demand
(in at least one of the states) would encourage more production. The eﬀect










q2 < 0, (44)
where the ﬁrst-order condition (the envelope theorem) has been used. What
condition (44) shows is that an improved good state in period 2 will encourage
27ﬁrm to invest more, but will make the investment riskier at the same time.
These results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 9 A increase in the demand for housing in a good state induces
the ﬁrms to produce more housing and makes such investment riskier.
8C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper introduces a simple model to explain the formation of bubbles in
the housing market in an emerging economy like Thailand, which was the
ﬁrst one that was forced to give up its currency pegging policy after months
of attack from speculators and huge capital ﬂight.
Housing is a durable good, and its production requires suﬃcient time and
capital. For an economy in which investors have access to the international
capital market, quite possibly rapid housing production leads to external
debts. Therefore development of a domestic housing market is associated
with risks about the future demand and the risks that failed ﬁrms could not
repay external loans, thus damaging the creditworthiness of the economy in
international capital markets.
Of course, if the economy remains on the good side all the time so that
all the housing units produced can be sold at proﬁtable prices, ﬁrms have no
trouble in repaying external debts. Risks exist because bad times can happen
and because bubbles can be formed.
In this paper, diﬀerent concepts of bubbles are introduced. When the in-
vestors are overoptimistic, they oversupply. Such oversupply will lead to drop
in prices in all possible states, thus raising the vulnerability of the ﬁrms dur-
ing bad times. Even if it is not obvious that ﬁrms are overoptimistic, bubbles
exist if there is a danger that a large number of ﬁrms may experience huge
losses. When these ﬁrms fail, they create bad loans to ﬁnancial institutions,
which may have diﬃculties in repaying the loans they raise abroad.
Two fundamental questions arise. Why would ﬁrms become overopti-
mistic? Why would ﬁrms be willing to invest in the housing market, and
why would ﬁnancial institutions be willing to lend them money for invest-
ment, if it is recognized that there are bad times when many of the ﬁrms
m a yn o tb ea b l et or e p a yt h e i rl o a n s ?
The answers we provide to the ﬁrst question is that overoptimism could
exist when: (i) housing production takes time while the future is uncertain;
28(ii) the probability of a particular state is unobservable; (iii) the history of
growth of the emerging economy is short, making reliable estimation of the
probabilities of states diﬃcult; (iv) people tend to act close to each other,
a phenomenon called the herding eﬀect, and (v) long periods of good times
would cause people to be over-conﬁdent about the probability of good times
in the future.
The answer to the second question can be found from the following
facts/conditions: (a) bankruptcy does not represent all the costs of failed
investment for the investors; (b) moral hazard exists in the domestic ﬁnan-
cial institutions, which believe that the government will bail them out when
they are in trouble; (c) moral hazard exists in the international ﬁnancial in-
stitutions, which lend money to the domestic ﬁnancial institutions, believing
that some international organizations such as the International Monetary
Fund will bail out the country if troubles arise.
The present paper also points out an irony in these emerging market. The
vulnerability of the ﬁrms and the market can be enhanced by the growth of
the economy in two ways: (a) if the economy experiences more periods of
good time; or (b) if the demand for housing in a particular state improves. In
each of these cases, ﬁrms are induced to invest more, making their investment
riskier.
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